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“HOME SWEET HOME”: DEFINING A CHILD’S
RESIDENCE TO ESTABLISH ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION IN CASES INVOLVING FAMILY
ABDUCTION
Erin Myers *
I. INTRODUCTION
The sudden disappearance of a child is commonly coupled with
thoughts of the child being lured away by a stranger. Unfortunately,
society does not recognize that the abductor is often the child’s parent.
Family abduction, as such an event is referred to, is considered to be a
serious crime rather than a child custody issue. 1 The National Incidence
Studies of Missing, Abducted, Runaway, and Thrownaway Children
(NISMART) has defined family abduction as “the taking or keeping of a
child by a family member in violation of a custody order, a decree, or
other legitimate custodial rights, where the taking or keeping involved
some element of concealment, flight, or intent to deprive a lawful
custodian indefinitely of custodial privileges.” 2
Family abduction generally occurs after a divorce has been filed,
remarriage has occurred, or one spouse plans a geographic move without
the other spouse’s consent. 3 In 1999, approximately 203,900 children
were victims of family abduction. 4 Fifty-three percent of such victims

*

J.D. 2013, Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law; B.S. 2010, summa cum
laude, University of Central Florida. The author served as the Editor in Chief of the
2012–2013 Child and Family Law Journal. She would like to thank everyone who helped
during the development and editing process of this article, especially Patrick Burton, her
Note and Comment Editor from Barry Law Review.
1
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Crime
of Family Abduction: A Child’s and Parent’s Perspective 3 (1st ed. 2010).
2
Heather Hammer et al., National Incidence Studies of Missing, Abducted, Runaway, and
Thrownaway Children, Children Abducted by Family Members: National Estimates and
Characteristics 2 (2002).
3
Dorothy S. Huntington, Parental Kidnapping: A New Form of Child Abuse 8 (1984).
4
Hammer et al., supra note 3, at 2.
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were taken by the child’s father, while twenty-five percent were taken by
the child’s mother. 5 Even more significant, eighty-two percent of
parental abductors had the intent to permanently affect custody. 6
Family abduction, from the child’s viewpoint, is considered to be a
severe form of child abuse. 7 Often in these troubled situations the child is
used as a pawn in the hostile custody battle between separated spouses. 8
Sam F., a family abduction victim, narrated, “[t]hey [the parental
abductor] stop treating their child as a person, and instead, treat their
child as a piece of property.” 9 Consequently, children in these situations
become more like “hostages” and have difficulty understanding that he
or she was removed from a parent who truly loves and desires to
discover the child’s location. 10 Parents may also use the child either as an
attempt for reconciliation or as an attempt to discredit the non-abducting
parent by subjecting the child to lies about that parent. 11 As a result, a
sense of guilt is created in the mind of the child who begins to feel that
the family separation and abduction are his or her fault. 12
Family abduction may also cause the child to lose a sense of self,
which includes knowing one’s family history and beginnings. 13 Liss,
another family abduction victim, described, “[f]amily abduction is about
your family being eradicated from the face of the earth.” 14 Long-term
effects of family abduction on the child include a sense of vulnerability
and distrust, which can be detrimental to the child. 15 Child victims of
family abduction may also suffer from reactive attachment disorder,
generalized anxiety disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder as
adults. 16
When family abduction occurs, the abducting parent frequently
moves the child beyond the jurisdiction of the law governing the child
custody proceeding. This may be either a domestic or international move,
and usually occurs in order to obtain a more favorable forum in which to

5

Hammer et al., supra note 2, at 2.
Id. at 8.
7
Huntington, supra note 3, at 6.
8
Id. at 6-9.
9
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note
1, at 4.
10
Id. at 4.
11
Huntington, supra note 3, at 4, 9.
12
Nancy Faulkner, Parental Child Abduction is Child Abuse 11 (1999).
13
Id. at 16.
14
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, supra note 1, at 14.
15
Huntington, supra note 3, at 16.
16
Faulkner, supra note 12, at 1.
6
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file the proceeding. 17 To confront the increasing occurrence of family
abduction, the United States and the international community have
developed approaches to address the problem as related to establishing
original jurisdiction in child custody proceedings. The domestic
approach implemented the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). 18 The international approach implemented
the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction (Convention). 19
Each approach has implemented a law based on the primary goal of
preserving the child’s well-being where the child is most familiar. In
order to achieve the preservation goal, each approach uses a different
term to describe the location where the child is most familiar. The
UCCJEA refers to this location as the child’s home state. 20 The
Convention refers to this location as the child’s habitual residence. 21
However, the UCCJEA provides a definition of home state to establish
original jurisdiction in domestic child custody proceedings. 22
Conversely, the international approach has failed to define the meaning
of habitual residence. 23 Failure to define this critical term to establish
original jurisdiction in international child custody proceedings harbors an
unpredictable interpretation and application of the Convention. Due to
the importance of the interests at stake, each approach should be
analyzed to determine whether a defined term of residence to establish
original jurisdiction in child custody proceedings more adequately
addresses the needs of child victims of family abduction.
In this Article, Part II will discuss the domestic approach under the
UCCJEA and the stringent standard enacted in Section 201(a) for the
exercise of original jurisdiction in a domestic child custody proceeding.
Part II will also examine case law to demonstrate how courts determine
the child’s home state under the UCCJEA. Part III of this Article will
discuss the international approach under the Convention and the
guarantee of Article 3 for the exercise of original jurisdiction to be
17

Id. at 3.
Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
and Enforcement Act (1997).
19
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, October 25,
1980.
20
Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 18, at 23.
21
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note
19, at preamble.
22
Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 18, at 23.
23
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note
19, at preamble (mentioning the term “habitual residence,” but failing to define the term
or state what qualifies as “habitual residence”).
18
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granted to the country of the child’s habitual residence in an international
child custody proceeding. Part III will also examine case law to
demonstrate how courts in the United States determine the child’s
habitual residence under the Convention. Part IV of this Article will
compare and contrast the UCCJEA and the Convention to consider
which approach is more effective in granting original jurisdiction in child
custody proceedings. Finally, a determination will be made as to whether
the Convention would become more effective if the child’s habitual
residence were to be defined.
II. THE DOMESTIC APPROACH: THE UCCJEA
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) first addressed the problem of interstate family abduction by
promulgating the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) in
1968. 24 Subsequently, the UCCJA was adopted by all fifty states as part
of the effort to deter interstate family abductions. 25 The fundamental goal
of the UCCJA was to eliminate interstate competition by permitting only
one state to exercise jurisdiction in a child custody proceeding. 26 The
federal government also addressed the problem of family abduction in
1980 by enacting the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) 27 to
promote interstate cooperation by requiring full faith and credit to be
given to judgments in child custody proceedings in each state. 28
However, as the American Bar Association’s Center on Children and the
Law observed, inconsistent interpretation of the UCCJA and difficulties
with the technical application of the PKPA resulted in the loss of
nationwide uniformity in child custody proceedings. 29 Accordingly,
states were unable to achieve the independent goals of either the UCCJA
or the PKPA laws without violating a provision of the other law. 30
The issues surrounding the UCCJA and PLKA led the NCCUSL to
draft the UCCJEA in 1997. 31 The American Bar Association (ABA)

24

Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 18.
Id.
26
David A. Blumberg, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act: A
Focused Introduction, THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID A. BLUMBERG: UCCJEA RESOURCES:
ARTICLES & PRESENTATIONS, http://www.uccjea.net/resources/documents/lectureoutline.pdf (last updated July 8, 2012).
27
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1980).
28
Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 18, at 1.
29
Id. at 2.
30
Id. at 1.
31
Id.
25
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approved the UCCJEA in 1998. 32 Alaska was the first state to adopt the
UCCJEA in September 1998. 33 As of July 2012, forty-nine states, as well
as the District of Columbia, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, have
adopted the UCCJEA. 34 Massachusetts, the sole state to not have
adopted the UCCJEA, has a bill pending in the state legislature
proposing its enactment. 35
The NCCUSL’s principal objective in drafting the UCCJEA was to
create a clear, yet stringent standard for the exercise of original
jurisdiction in interstate child custody proceedings. 36 In particular, the
UCCJEA was primarily drafted to protect the child victim from being
harmed as a result of interstate family abduction. 37 Furthermore, the
UCCJEA is designed to encourage child custody determinations to be
made in the state that can most adequately determine the best interest of
the child, as well as to prevent the re-litigation of child custody issues
and interstate jurisdictional competition. 38
A. Section 201(a) of the UCCJEA
Section 201(a) of the UCCJEA provides four exclusive
jurisdictional bases for a state court to establish original jurisdiction in a
child custody proceeding. 39 First, and most important, a state court can
make an initial determination in a child custody proceeding if it is the
home state of a child under Section 201(a)(1). 40 A state qualifies as a
child’s home state if it is the child’s home state on the date the initial
child custody proceeding is filed. 41 A child’s absence from the state
within six months prior to filing does not disqualify the state as the
child’s home state as long as a parent, or person acting as a parent,
continues to live in the state. 42 This “temporary absence” provision is
designed to preserve a state’s home state status during the period
required for another state to become the child’s new home state by
32

Id.
THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID A. BLUMBERG: UCCJEA ADOPTION TABLE,
http://www.uccjea.net/resources/adoptions.shtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2012); See ALASKA
STAT. §§ 25.30.300-.910 (1998).
34
THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID A. BLUMBERG: UCCJEA ADOPTION TABLE,
http://www.uccjea.net/resources/adoptions.shtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2012).
35
Blumberg, supra note 26.
36
Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 18, at 1.
37
Id. at 7.
38
Id. at 1.
39
Id. at 24.
40
Id. at 23.
41
Id.
42
Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 18, at 23.
33
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allowing the state to exercise original jurisdiction if, at any time during
the six months preceding the filing of the child custody proceeding, the
state qualified as the child’s home state. 43 Hence, the court must
determine whether the child lived with a parent, or person acting as a
parent, in a particular state for at least six consecutive months at any time
before the child custody proceeding was filed. 44
Second, under Section 201(a)(2), a state court can exercise original
jurisdiction if another state court does not qualify under Section
201(a)(1) or if a home state court declines to exercise such jurisdiction in
a child custody proceeding. 45 However, there are two elements that must
also be shown for a state court to exercise original jurisdiction under
Section 201(a)(2). 46 The first element is for the child and at least one of
the child’s parents to have a significant connection with the state beyond
mere physical presence. 47 This element is consistent with an underlying
policy of Section 201 that physical presence is neither necessary nor
sufficient to enable a state court to make a child custody determination. 48
The second element is for substantial evidence to be available in the state
sought to be determined as the child’s home state regarding “the child’s
care, protection, training, and personal relationships” within that state. 49
Third, under Section 201(a)(3), a state court can exercise original
jurisdiction in a child custody proceeding as the more appropriate forum
for the proceeding if another state court declines to exercise jurisdiction
under sections 201(a)(1) and 201(a)(2). 50 In addition, each state
legislature has directed the courts to respect the decision of another state
court that has properly asserted jurisdiction according to Section 201.51
Fourth, under Section 201(a)(4), a state court can exercise original
jurisdiction in a child custody proceeding if there is no court of any other
state that could exercise jurisdiction under Section 201(a)(1), Section
201(a)(2), or Section 201(a)(3). 52

43

See, e.g., Sarpel v. Elfanli, 65 So. 3d 1080, 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); R.M. v.
J.S., 20 A.3d 496, 503–504 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011); Prizzia v. Prizzia, 707 S.E.2d 461,
466–67 (Va. Ct. App. 2011).
44
Prizzia, 707 S.E.2d at 461.
45
Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 18, at 23.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 26.
49
Id. at 23.
50
Id.
51
Waltenburg v. Waltenburg, 270 S.W.3d 308, 314–15 (Tex. App. 2008).
52
Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 18, at 24.
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B. “Home State” Determination
Courts have recognized its chief objective “is to give effect to the
purpose of the [A]ct as intended by the Legislature.” 53 The intent of the
UCCJEA in creating a stringent standard to establish original jurisdiction
in a child custody proceeding is prioritization of the child’s home state,
which is determined based upon circumstances at the time the suit is
filed. In making this determination, the location of the child and the
child’s parents are a crucial element. 54 Therefore, to achieve the intent of
Section 201, courts must literally interpret the UCCJEA by the words’
plain and ordinary meaning. 55
Several state courts have held the UCCJEA’s language to be clear
and unambiguous by defining the child’s home state as the place the
child has “lived with a parent” for six consecutive months prior to the
filing of a child custody proceeding. 56 For example, in a child custody
proceeding filed by the child’s mother on April 8, 2010, in Pennsylvania,
the child was in Pennsylvania uninterrupted from August 22, 2009, until
March 5, 2010. 57 As a result, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania upheld
the determination of Pennsylvania as the child’s home state because the
child was in Pennsylvania for six consecutive months prior to the
commencement of the proceeding by the child’s mother. 58 Therefore,
Pennsylvania was granted original jurisdiction to determine the merits of
the child custody proceeding. 59
Despite this clear and unambiguous interpretation of the child’s
home state, other state courts have inquired whether the term “lived with
a parent” should be objectively or subjectively interpreted. The Supreme
Court of Texas addressed this issue and determined a subjective intent
test would frustrate the purpose of the UCCJEA. 60 The court found the
word “lived” was used by the state legislature to avoid such a
complicated inquiry into the mind of the child or the child’s parents. 61
Therefore, the court held that an objective inquiry of the facts in
53
Sidell v. Sidell, 18 A.3d 499, 504 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Webster v. Perrotta, 774 A.2d
68, 75 (R.I. 2001)); See also R.M. v. J.S., 20 A.3d 496, 502 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011); Powell
v. Stover, 165 S.W.3d 322, 326 (Tex. 2005).
54
Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 19, at 24; See also In re
Marriage of Marsalis, 338 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tex. 2011).
55
See, e.g., B.B. v. A.B., 916 N.Y.S.2d 920, 924 (2011); Sidell, 18 A.3d at 505; Powell,
165 S.W.3d at 326.
56
See, e.g., R.M., 20 A.3d at 505; Powell, 165 S.W.3d at 326.
57
R.M., 20 A.3d at 498–99.
58
R.M., 20 A.3d at 504.
59
Id.
60
Powell v. Stover, 165 S.W.3d 322, 325–26 (Tex. 2005).
61
Id.
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determining original jurisdiction in a child custody proceeding creates
jurisdictional certainty without mitigating the significance of the facts of
each individual case. 62 Based on the objective intent test, the court held
the mother’s intent to stay in Tennessee with the child for a temporary
period of time was insufficient to establish Texas as the child’s home
state. 63 Thus, the court granted Tennessee original jurisdiction as the
child’s home state in the child custody proceeding because of the child’s
presence in the state for more than ten months prior to the filing of the
proceeding. 64 The Court of Appeals of Virginia has also implemented the
objective intent test in child custody proceedings when determining
original jurisdiction. Specifically, the court found a mother’s future
intent to live in Hungary did not disqualify Virginia as the children’s
home state when the children had lived in Virginia for over two-and-ahalf years prior to the filing of the proceeding. 65 As a result, Virginia was
granted original jurisdiction to determine the merits of the child custody
proceeding. 66
Several state courts have also interpreted the “temporary absence”
provision as a protection of both parents, not just the parent who no
longer lives in the home state. 67 Accordingly, the court’s inquiry must
focus on the individual—whether the child, parent, or person acting as a
parent—who remains in the home state. 68 This provision was analyzed in
a child custody proceeding in which each parent initiated a proceeding—
the mother in her native Hungary, where she remained with the children,
and the father in Virginia. 69 The Court of Appeals of Virginia found the
trial court failed to follow requirements of the UCCJEA’s “temporary
absence” provision by deferring original jurisdiction of the child custody
proceeding to the Hungarian court. 70 The court held that the children’s
visit to Hungary should have been deemed a temporary absence because
the children had not been in the country for at least six months to
establish Hungary as the children’s home state. 71 Therefore, Virginia
remained the children’s home state as it had been in the six months prior

62

Id. at 327–28.
Id. at 326.
64
Id. at 322, 328.
65
Prizzia v. Prizzia, 707 S.E.2d 461, 468 n.6 (Va. Ct. App. 2011).
66
Id. at 467–68.
67
Powell v. Stover, 165 S.W.3d 322, 325–26 (Tex. 2005).
68
Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 18, at 24–25.
69
Prizzia, 707 S.E.2d at 465.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 468.
63
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to the father’s commencement of the child custody proceeding and was
granted original jurisdiction. 72
Nonetheless, the UCCJEA is not clear in defining all terms relating
to the establishment of original jurisdiction in a child custody
proceeding. The UCCJEA fails to define the term “significant
connection,” which is used when the most appropriate forum must be
determined because home state jurisdiction is not established under
Section 201(a)(1). Similar to the inquiry of the “temporary absence”
provision, a court must focus on the individual remaining in the state
sought to be determined as the child’s home state. For example, the
inquiry in a child custody proceeding filed in the Supreme Court of
Montana focused on the father’s connection to Montana when the mother
removed the child to Kentucky. 73 The court found that the father’s
permanent residence, the presence of the child’s extended family, and the
child’s extensive time spent within the state visiting under the father’s
custody rights qualified as “significant connections” to Montana. 74
Therefore, the court determined Montana was the child’s home state and
granted the State original jurisdiction to determine the merits of the child
custody proceeding. 75
The UCCJEA also fails to define what qualifies as “substantial
evidence … regarding the child’s care, protection, training, and personal
relationships” within the state for a state to establish original jurisdiction
in a child custody proceeding. 76 Thus, a court must analyze the facts of
the individual case to determine if such “substantial evidence” exists to
support the establishment of a particular state as the child’s home state. 77
An important consideration in this determination is whether the “care,
protection, training, or personal relationships” in a state have deeply
impacted the children. 78 For example, the Court of Appeals of Texas
addressed the “substantial evidence” question in a child custody
proceeding in which the children had frequently visited Texas, where the
children’s paternal grandparents also lived. 79 After living in Texas for
four months, the children’s mother removed them to Louisiana. 80 The
court found the evidence within Texas failed to demonstrate a significant
72

Id. at 467–68.
In re Marriage of Lloyd, 255 P.3d 166, 171 (Mont. 2011).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 18, at 23.
77
In re Marriage of Marsalis, 338 S.W.3d 131, 136 (Tex. 2011)
78
Id. at 137.
79
Id.
80
Id.
73
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effect on the children’s lives to establish Texas as the children’s home
state. 81 Hence, Texas could not exercise original jurisdiction in the child
custody proceeding based on the “substantial evidence” provision. 82 The
Court of Appeals of Louisiana has also answered the “substantial
evidence” question. 83 The court found the child’s attendance in school
and continuous care in Louisiana in the six consecutive months prior to
the filing of the child custody proceeding was substantial evidence to
grant Louisiana home state jurisdiction in the child custody proceeding. 84
In determining which state can exercise original jurisdiction in
interstate child custody proceedings, the UCCJEA has chosen to define
the child’s home state. While the UCCJEA has chosen to define this
term, the Convention has failed to define the child’s habitual residence.
This lack of a definition has led to a different, yet similar, approach in
determining which country can exercise original jurisdiction in
international child custody proceedings. However, an analysis must be
performed to determine whether the Convention’s lack of a defined term
has a negative impact on the children that the Convention is intended to
protect.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL APPROACH: HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE
CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION
In 1980, the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction (Convention) was adopted to address the
problem of international family abduction as it relates to child custody
proceedings. 85 A central goal of the Convention is to ensure that the
custody rights of one ratifying country are competently honored in other
ratifying countries. 86 Accordingly, the court in which the action is
brought must determine the child custody proceeding in accordance with
the terms of the Hague Convention. 87
One of the most common situations that arise under the Convention
is when one parent attempts to acquire an advantage in a child custody

81

In re Marriage of Marsalis, 338 S.W.3d at 137.
Id. at 137–38 (however, because no other state court could exercise jurisdiction in the
case, Texas was permitted to exercise original jurisdiction in the proceeding.).
83
In re A.U.M., 62 So. 3d 185, 188 (La. Ct. App. 2011).
84
Id.
85
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note
19.
86
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note
19, at art. 1(b).
87
International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(d) (1988).
82
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proceeding by moving with the child across international borders. 88
Ordinarily, the abducting parent seeks exclusive care of the child to earn
sympathy from the court in the new jurisdiction. 89 The Convention
attempts to deter such parental behavior by seeking the prompt return of
a wrongfully removed child to the ratifying country. 90 This results in a
“rapid remedy” to restore the family environment to the state that it was
prior to the abduction, which protects the non-abducting parent’s custody
rights. 91 The “rapid remedy” also essentially eliminates the parent
abductor’s motivation to gain a legal advantage because judicial relief
will be deprived in the less appropriate jurisdictional forum, which is
usually the forum where the child is removed. 92
Despite the Convention’s focus on the actions of the parent, the
Convention principally seeks to protect the abducted children from their
lives being further altered. 93 The Preamble reflects this goal by
expressing that the Convention is designed “to protect children
internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or
retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the
State of their habitual residence as well as to secure protection for rights
of access.” 94 As a result, situations where the child has been removed
from the family and social environment in which the child’s life has
developed are sought to be corrected. 95 Ultimately, this goal can be
achieved if the child is viewed as having individual rights and is no
longer viewed as property of the child’s parents. 96

88

Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1402 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding that “there is a
central core of matters at which the Hague Convention was aimed: situations where one
parent attempts to settle a difficult family situation, and obtain an advantage in any
possible future custody struggle, by returning to the parent’s native country, or country of
preferred residence.”).
89
Beaumont & McEleavy, The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction 1
(1999).
90
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note
19, at art. 1(a).
91
Shealy v. Shealy, 205 F.3d 1117, 1121 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Karin Wolfe, A Tale of
Two States: Successes and Failure of the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction in the United States and Germany, 33 N.Y.U.J. OF INT’L L.
& POL. 285, 299 (2000)).
92
Elisa Perez–Vera, Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention
429 ¶ 16 (1982).
93
Id. at 448 ¶ 72.
94
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note
19, at preamble.
95
Perez–Vera, supra note 92, at 428 ¶12.
96
Id. at 431 ¶ 24.
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Since its adoption, more than fifty countries have ratified the
Convention. 97 The United States ratified the Convention, which has a
legal status of a treaty, in 1988. 98 As a signatory, the United States
implemented the Convention by federal statute under the International
Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA). 99
A. Article 3 of the Convention
Article 3 of the Convention requires that the determination of
whether a child’s removal was wrongful be made under the laws of the
State in which the child has his or her habitual residence. 100 Under the
Convention, a parent’s rights of custody include, “rights relating to the
care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine
the child’s place of residence.” 101 The removal of a child is considered
wrongful when the non-abducting parent’s custody rights—when
exercised or would have been exercised if not for the child’s removal—
are breached under the law of the State of the child’s habitual residence
immediately preceding the child’s removal. 102 As a result, the nonabducting parent cannot invoke the Convention unless the abducted child
is a habitual resident of the signatory country. 103
Accordingly, application of the Convention depends on the
determination of the child’s habitual residence when the child custody
proceeding is initially filed. 104 Such place is generally where the child is
most familiar and is within the forum where a court can best serve the
child’s interests. 105 Under the Convention, a child can only have one
habitual residence, which must be determined at the time immediately
prior to the child’s abduction. 106 Furthermore, the child’s place of birth is
not automatically the child’s habitual residence. 107 Once the child’s
97

Blumberg, supra note 26.
Id.
99
International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11601 et seq. (1988).
100
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note
19, at art. 3.
101
Id. at art. 5(a).
102
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note
19, at art. 3(a)–(b).
103
Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 2005).
104
Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703, 709 (7th Cir. 2006).
105
Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1995 (2010).
106
Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 897–98 (8th Cir. 2003); Friedrich v. Friedrich,
983 F.2d 1396, 1400 (6th Cir. 1993).
107
Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1020 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Nonetheless, if a child is born
where the parents have their habitual residence, the child normally should be regarded as
a habitual residence of that country.” (citations omitted)).
98
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habitual residence is identified, the Convention guarantees a court in that
country original jurisdiction in the child custody proceeding and the
dispute must then be resolved under the laws of that country. 108 The
Convention then requires the child to be returned to the child’s habitual
residence if the non-abducting parent files a valid petition within one
year of the wrongful removal. 109
B. Habitual Residence Determination
The determination of the child’s habitual residence immediately
before the wrongful removal is the most difficult issue for a court to
decide when applying Article 3 in a child custody proceeding. 110 This
difficulty primarily arises due to the Convention’s lack of definition of
the term habitual residence. 111 The Supreme Court has also failed to
define the meaning of habitual residence under the Convention when
applied in child custody proceedings initiated in the United States. 112 In
addition, Congress has encouraged uniform international interpretation of
the Convention’s terms to provide stability for the child, which it
believes is part of the Convention’s framework. 113 Hence, courts are
encouraged to prevent the wrongful removal of the child from “the
family and social environment in which its life has developed” by
preserving the child’s habitual residence. 114
Judge M. Margaret McKeown of the Ninth Circuit has suggested
that habitual residence may have been intentionally left undefined to
assist courts in creating formalistic determinations in child custody
proceedings without the term becoming rigid. 115 Further, courts have also
hoped restrictive rules for determining the meaning of habitual residence
will not be implemented so “[t]he facts and circumstances of each case
should continue to be assessed without resort to presumptions or
presuppositions.” 116 Nevertheless, the federal courts of appeals in the
108
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United States have developed a general guideline to determine a child’s
habitual residence in a child custody proceeding. The everyday non-legal
meaning of habitual residence is to be used for interpretation in reference
to the circumstances of each case. 117 Application of the legal meaning of
habitual residence would promote forum shopping by allowing the
abducting parent to seek a forum that defines the term in that parent’s
favor, which contravenes a chief objective of the Convention. 118
The guideline developed by the federal court of appeals includes a
two-prong analysis to determine a child’s habitual residence to establish
original jurisdiction in a child custody proceeding. The first prong is a
subjective inquiry of the intent to abandon the child’s previous habitual
residence, which includes a settled purpose to establish a new habitual
residence. 119 The intent to abandon can be formed after the child has
been removed from the previous habitual residence, can exist even only
if he or she in the new environment for a limited period of time, and can
be implied from actions surrounding the child’s removal. 120 However,
the intent to abandon must be a past intent. 121 Consequently, a future
intent to return to the child’s previous habitual residence does not
preserve that country as the child’s habitual residence. 122
The inquiry of the intent to abandon the child’s previous habitual
residence is where a lack of definition of habitual residence has led to the
most confusion amongst courts when applying Article 3 of the
Convention. The majority view is to “focus on the intent of the child’s
parents or others who may fix the child’s residence,” because “[c]hildren
. . . normally lack the material and psychological wherewithal to decide
where they will reside.” 123 Accordingly, parental intent serves for that of
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a child who has not yet reached the maturity to make a competent
decision as to where to establish a permanent residence. 124
Because separated parents often disagree as to where the child
should reside, under the majority view, a court must determine the
parent’s last place of mutual intent for the child’s habitual residence
based on all available evidence. 125 To make such a determination, a court
must analyze factors that include:
[P]arental employment in the new country of
residence; the purchase of a home in the new country
and the sale of a home in the former country; martial
stability; the retention of close ties to the former
country; the storage and shipment of family
possessions; the citizenship status of the parents and
children; and the stability of the home environment in
the new country of residence. 126

A contractual determination of the child’s habitual residence is not
included as a factor because it would violate the goal of the Convention
by creating a false jurisdictional link that removes the child from its
familiar environment. 127 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
took these factors into consideration in determining the habitual
residence of quadruplets in a child custody proceeding initiated by the
children’s father in Australia. 128 The court based its determination on the
evidence which demonstrated the children’s mother left personal
possessions in North Carolina, traveled with tourist visas and reserved
round-trip tickets for herself and the children, kept American health and
car insurance, and sought to return to the United States after five weeks
in Australia. 129 Therefore, the United States, not Australia, was
determined to be the children’s habitual residence and was granted
original jurisdiction to determine the merits of the child custody
proceeding. 130
Still, a mutual intent to abandon the child’s previous habitual
residence may not exist. When there is no such mutual intent, a court
should find a change in the child’s habitual residence only when “the
124
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objective facts point unequivocally to a person’s ordinary or habitual
residence being in a particular place” and not based solely on the child’s
contacts in the new environment. 131 Thus, a change in the child’s
habitual residence will occur either when the child does not have a
habitual residence or when the child’s presence is meant for a limited
period because it is accepted that the child will soon lose connections to
the previous habitual residence. 132 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit was faced with this situation in a child custody proceeding filed
in the United States by the children’s mother. 133 During the time agreed
upon for the children to complete a year of school in the United States
and then return to Israel, the children learned English and made
American friends. 134 The court found this evidence did not unequivocally
point to a change in the children’s habitual residence from Israel to the
United States at the time the child custody proceeding was filed. 135
Therefore, Israel, not the United States, could exercise original
jurisdiction to determine the merits of the proceeding. 136
The minority view regarding the analysis of the intent to abandon
the child’s previous habitual residence is to conduct a subjective inquiry
from the child’s perspective. 137 This view is premised on the belief that
the inquiry of the parents’ subjective intent would allow a parent to
legally abduct a child by conveying an objection to an upcoming
geographic move. 138 Thus, one parent’s express disagreement during a
geographic move is insufficient to eliminate the intent to abandon the
child’s previous habitual residence. 139 For example, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit found a mother’s lack of intent to permanently
remain in Australia and return to the United States if the marriage did not
improve neither disqualified Australia, where the father had found work,
as the child’s habitual residence nor prevented Australia from exercising

131

Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1081 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Zenel v. Haddow, 1993
S.L.T. 975, 979 (Scot. 1st Div.)) (emphasis added).
132
Id. at 1082.
133
Id. at 1083.
134
Id. at 1082–83.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 993 (6th Cir. 2007); See also Friedrich v. Freidrich,
983 F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1993).
138
Robert, 507 F.3d at 992.
139
See, e.g., Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 899 (8th Cir. 2003); Mozes v. Mozes,
239 F.3d 1067, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 2001); Feder v. Evans–Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 220, 224
(3d Cir. 1995).

158

CHILD AND FAMILY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. I:142

original jurisdiction to determine the merits of the child custody
proceeding. 140
Similar to the factors considered by a court in determining parental
intent, factors to determine a child’s intent to abandon a previous
habitual residence include:
[T]he family’s change in geography along with their
personal possessions and pets, the passage of time, the
family abandoning its prior residence and selling the
house, the application for and securing of benefits
only available to . . . immigrants, the children’s
enrollment in school, and, to some degree, both
parents’ intentions at the time of the move. 141

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit analyzed these factors in
a child custody proceeding between the father, who lived in the United
States, and the mother, who lived in Finland. 142 The court found evidence
that the child, who is believed to possess the sole authority to decide
where to reside, had expressed a desire to remain in the United States
after a summer vacation with her father. 143 The child also brought a
majority of her personal possessions to the United States and began
attending an American school. 144 Therefore, the court held that the child
had abandoned Finland as her habitual residence with a settled purpose
to establish United States as her new habitual residence. 145 Accordingly,
the United States was granted the authority to establish original
jurisdiction to the child custody proceeding. 146
The second prong of the analysis to determine a child’s habitual
residence is whether the child has sufficiently acclimatized to the new
place of habitual residence to establish a change in the child’s habitual
residence. 147 A change in habitual residence is established if the evidence
demonstrates the child would be harmed by the removal from the new
environment, even if the child were to return to the previous
environment. 148 This prong is based on achieving the Convention’s goal
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of deterring family abduction by maintaining the child’s sense of
normalcy before the abduction occurred. 149
Yet again, both the Convention and the Supreme Court have failed
to define the term “acclimatization” in the determination of a child’s
habitual residence. As a result, courts must analyze several factors to
determine whether the child has adapted to the new environment, which
include: (1) the child’s enrollment in school; (2) the child’s participation
in social activities, such as sports; (3) the child’s length of stay in the
previous and new environments; (4) the child’s meaningful connections
in the new environment; (5) the child’s age; and (6) an actual change in
geography prior to the abduction. 150 The child’s cultural ties—as Judge
M. Margaret McKeown of the Ninth Circuit explained—are not
considered because “then countless expatriate children around the globe
would already have satisfied a significant component of the requirements
for becoming habitual residents of the United States based on an affinity
for McDonald’s, Mickey Mouse, and Michael Jordan.” 151
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit analyzed these factors in
a child custody proceeding to determine the habitual residence of twins
removed by their mother from France to the United States. 152 The court
found the evidence demonstrated the twins’ socialization in the United
States—by attending school and building relationships with their
American relatives—during their ten-month stay outweighed stay
outweighed the twins’ three-week visit to France. 153 Thus, the twins’
time in France was held to be a vacation from the twins’ habitual
residence in the United States. 154 Therefore, the United States was
granted original jurisdiction to determine the merits of the child custody
proceeding. 155 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also analyzed
these factors to determine the habitual residence of a child removed from
Germany to the United States by the child’s mother, without the father’s
knowledge. 156 The child was born in Germany, where he remained
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permanently until his removal to the United States. 157 The court held the
child’s three-day stay on a United States military base did not qualify as
a change in geography; thus, Germany was the child’s habitual
residence. 158 Accordingly, only Germany could exercise original
jurisdiction in the child custody proceeding. 159
Courts have also not established a time period required to satisfy
the child’s acclimatization to the new environment. In a dissenting
opinion, Judge Sarokin for the Third Circuit argued that the time period
is less than one year because of the Convention’s provision preventing a
child’s return when the proceeding is filed after the child has been in the
new environment for more than one year. 160 Generally, such a short
period of time will only be sufficient if the child moves with both parents
because of the child’s extraordinary adaptability and ability to make
connections while remaining aware of an already established
environment. 161
But when the geographic move is intended by one parent to prevent
acclimatization to the new environment, even a lengthy period of time
may not be sufficient. 162 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
analyzed the time factor in a child custody proceeding where the children
were removed from the United States to Greece. 163 During the four
months spent in Greece, where the children had previously only spent
three or four short vacations, the children lived in three different homes
and spoke little Greek. 164 The court considered this evidence of the
children’s irregular home environment during the four-month time period
as insufficient to establish “deep-rooted ties” to Greece. 165 Therefore,
Greece was not established as the children’s habitual residence and the
United States maintained the authority to assert original jurisdiction to
determine the merits of the child custody proceeding. 166
In determining a child’s habitual residence to establish original
jurisdiction in a child custody proceeding, a court usually gives each
prong of the analysis equal weight. The exception is when the child
custody proceeding involves a child of a young age, who is viewed as
157
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lacking the capability to acclimatize to the new environment independent
of the child’s parent; thus, the parents’ mutual intent as to the child’s
habitual residence outweighs the child’s acclimatization. 167 The rationale
behind this exception is to prevent the child from being manipulated by
one parent seeking to alter the child’s habitual residence at the earliest
possible age, especially if the visit was only intended to be temporary.168
For instance, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in determining
Canada as the one-year-old child’s habitual residence, held that the
parents’ shared intentions for the child to live in Canada for two years
was more important in the determination than the child’s
acclimatization. 169 Moreover, in cases involving older children, the
child’s acclimatization to the new environment can overcome the
absence of the intent to abandon the child’s habitual residence. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in determining Germany as the sevenyear-old child’s habitual residence, held that the eight months the child
spent in Germany was sufficient for acclimatization to German life. 170
Hence, the child’s acclimatization to Germany overcame the parent’s
lack of mutual intent to abandon the United States as the child’s habitual
residence. 171
IV. THE “BEST APPROACH”: THE UCCJEA’S DEFINED HOME STATE V.
THE CONVENTION’S UNDEFINED HABITUAL RESIDENCE
The United States, in drafting the UCCJEA to address domestic
family abduction, and the signatory countries, in drafting the Convention
to address international family abduction, both centered the
establishment of original jurisdiction in child custody proceedings on
either the child’s home state or the child’s habitual residence. Each
approach aims to achieve the same three fundamental goals: (1) the
prevention of the abducting parent to engage in forum shopping as an
attempt to gain a more sympathetic forum; (2) the litigation of the same
child custody proceeding in more than one jurisdiction; and (3) the
encouragement of respect for courts that have properly asserted
jurisdiction over the child custody proceeding. Both approaches
primarily seek the return of the wrongfully removed child to his or her
167
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most familiar environment, which may be determined by the child’s
significant connections to the state or country or substantial evidence
located within the state or country. Under the Convention, the most
familiar environment may also be determined by the child’s
acclimatization to the state or country. Often, this state or country
selected as the child’s most familiar environment is deemed to be the
most appropriate forum to make a determination in a child custody
proceeding in order to provide the child with a sense of stability and
normalcy. Furthermore, each approach seeks uniform interpretation of
the drafters’ intent of home state or habitual residence based on the plain
and ordinary meaning of the words used in the text.
Both the UCCJEA and the Convention analyze similar factors to
determine the location where the child is most familiar based on the time
of the abduction and filing of the child custody proceeding. These factors
include school attendance, location of extended family, and length of
stay in the state or country. The UCCJEA and the Convention both
require a majority of the evidence that demonstrates the impact of the
environment on the child’s development to be located within either the
state or country that is sought to establish original jurisdiction in the
child custody proceeding. If all of the evidence is within one state or
country, this allows for a quick determination of the child’s home state or
habitual residence to be made because all information required is readily
available within one jurisdiction. Thus, this requirement ensures that the
most appropriate forum, which can make a determination in the child’s
best interest, is granted original jurisdiction in the child custody
proceeding. Moreover, courts under each approach have the opportunity
to decline jurisdiction if another location is found to be the more
appropriate forum.
There are two key differences between the UCCJEA—which
defines home state—and the Convention—which does not define
habitual residence—which have a significant impact on the
determination of the child’s residence in the child custody proceeding.
The first difference is the UCCJEA expressly includes a “temporary
absence” provision in defining the child’s home state to preserve a state’s
ability to establish original jurisdiction in a child custody proceeding.172
In the case previously mentioned under the UCCJEA from the Virginia
Court of Appeals, the “temporary absence” provision preserved Virginia
as the children’s home state and, therefore, Virginia was granted original

172

Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 18, at 8.

2013]

Myers

163

jurisdiction to determine the merits of the child custody proceeding. 173 If
the UCCJEA had not expressly included this provision, it may have been
possible for a court to find Hungary to be the children’s home state
because the children had not been in Virginia for six consecutive months
prior to the filing of the child custody proceeding. As a result, the mother
in this case would have gained an advantage because Hungary is her
native country and, therefore, one of the goals of the UCCJEA would
have been violated. In addition, the children’s best interests would not
have been protected if such a determination had been made because the
most appropriate forum, which in this case was Virginia, would not have
had jurisdiction to make a determination on the merits of the child
custody proceeding.
Contrary to the UCCJEA, the Convention’s failure to define
habitual residence results in the lack of a “temporary absence” provision.
Such a provision would have been beneficial in the case previously
mentioned under the Convention from the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit. 174 Based on the court’s holding that the twins’ three-week visit to
France did not result in a change of the United States as the twins’
habitual residence, it appears the conclusion would have been the same if
determined under a “temporary absence” provision. However, if a
“temporary absence” provision were included within the Convention’s
definition of habitual residence, the court would have been able to make
the determination more quickly without going into such an in-depth
analysis of the twins’ time in France. The twins would have benefited
from a more rapid determination of their habitual residence by allowing
them to return to the United States as early as possible, and not remain in
France while the determination was made.
The inclusion of a “temporary absence” provision within the
Convention’s definition of habitual residence would also encourage a
potential parental abductor to behave in a more principled manner.
Besides the hopeful deterrence of the family abduction in the first
instance, such a provision could help prevent the parent from making an
argument that would be expressly prohibited if a “temporary absence”
provision applied. The parent would be unable to argue that the child has
acclimatized to the new environment, especially if the child has been in
the new country for a short period of time, because the parent is or
should be aware that a short absence from the child’s familiar
environment does not abandon that country as the child’s habitual
173
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residence. The result would be consistent with the Convention’s goal to
prevent the abducting parent from participating in forum shopping to
gain a legal advantage in the child custody proceeding by establishing
jurisdiction in a more sympathetic forum for that parent.
The second difference is that the UCCJEA’s definition of home
state limits a court’s inquiry to an objective standard. For example, in the
case previously mentioned under the UCCJEA from the Supreme Court
of Texas, the court only used an objective standard to analyze the facts to
determine that Tennessee, as the child’s home state, could establish
original jurisdiction to determine the merits of the child custody
proceeding. 175 If the UCCJEA’s definition of home state had not limited
the court’s inquiry to an objective standard, the mother’s intent of
remaining in Tennessee would have been considered in the court’s
determination of the child’s home state. Such a determination would
most likely have resulted in the original jurisdiction of the child custody
proceeding being established in Texas. As a result, Tennessee, where the
child had lived for almost ten months prior to the filing of the child
custody proceeding, would have been denied the opportunity to
determine the merits of the child custody proceeding. Thus, the best
interests of the child would have been deprived of the most appropriate
forum, which in this case was Tennessee, to establish original
jurisdiction in the child custody proceeding.
Conversely, the Convention’s lack of definition of habitual
residence permits an inquiry of the child’s habitual residence under a
subjective standard. For example, in the case previously mentioned under
the Convention from the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the
court subjectively analyzed the mother’s intent to determine the
quadruplets’ habitual residence was the United States. 176 If the
Convention had defined habitual residence to limit the court’s inquiry to
an objective standard, facts such as the mother’s purchase of round-trip
tickets and retention of American insurance would not have been
considered in determining the quadruplets’ habitual residence. Yet, there
is a strong possibility the court may still have found the United States to
be the quadruplet’s habitual residence because it is where almost all of
the quadruplets’ young lives were spent. Hence, the most appropriate
forum to make a determination in the child custody proceeding in the
child’s best interest still would have been granted original jurisdiction.
However, the court could have avoided the intense inquiry into the
175

Powell v. Stover, 165 S.W.3d 322, 326 (Tex. 2005).
Maxwell v. Maxwell, 588 F.3d 245, 252–53 (4th Cir. 2009).

176

2013]

Myers

165

mother’s intention while the quadruplets remained in Australia and the
quickest possible return to the United States would not have been
delayed.
The current interpretation of the Convention reveals a contradiction
of whether an objective or a subjective standard is preferred to determine
a child’s habitual residence. A subjective standard is permitted for the
intent to abandon the child’s previous habitual residence; but, an
objective standard is used to determine if the facts unequivocally show a
child’s residence is a particular country. The issue with the subjective
standard is that it becomes a complicated inquiry of the child’s mind, the
parent’s mind, or both, when determining the child’s residence. Such a
standard will almost certainly lead to differing results because the inquiry
predominantly
becomes
a
fact-intensive
analysis
based
disproportionately on circumstantial evidence and not necessarily based
on the most appropriate forum to serve the child’s best interest. The
objective inquiry approach, as used in UCCJEA based cases, still allows
the facts and circumstances of each individual case to remain the center
of the determination of the child’s residence while providing a sense of
jurisdictional certainty. Because greater importance is placed on avoiding
disruption to the child’s environment unless required by law under the
Convention, children who are victims of family abduction would benefit
from a definition of habitual residence that eliminates the subjective
approach.
A change in the text of the Convention—to define the child’s
habitual residence—would benefit the children who are victims of family
abduction. Although the current interpretation appears to achieve the
fundamental goals of the Convention, a definition of habitual residence
can accelerate the establishment of original jurisdiction in the most
appropriate forum in child custody proceedings while creating uniformity
of judicial interpretation and application of the Convention. Such a
definition would also preserve the child’s familial values when the
family environment in which the child is most familiar, prior to the
family abduction, is restored in a prompt manner. The Convention could
benefit from using the UCCJEA’s definition of “home state” as a guide
to define “habitual residence” while retaining construction of the term
most appropriately for family abduction within the international
community. For instance, signatories of the Convention would be able to
protect themselves as a wrongfully removed child’s habitual residence by
adopting a similar “temporary absence” provision. Thus, the country
would remain the child’s habitual residence during the time required for
another signatory country to become the child’s habitual residence.
Additionally, because removing a child across international borders may
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have a greater negative impact on the child, the international approach
may consider adopting a longer period of time than six months, as used
in the UCCJEA, to establish a habitual residence prior to the
commencement of the child custody proceeding. There may be a concern
that different signatory countries could apply different cultural meanings
while interpreting the definition of habitual residence, which would
prevent jurisdictional uniformity. However, this can be avoided, and
jurisdictional uniformity achieved, if the definition of habitual residence
adopts the United States’ approach of excluding cultural ties.
A definition of habitual residence would also create a more
stringent standard in establishing original jurisdiction in child custody
proceedings in cases involving international family abduction. The
current fear expressed by courts in the United States that habitual
residence would become too rigid if defined has resulted in almost too
much judicial discretion to use any factor or approach deemed
appropriate under the circumstances to determine the child’s habitual
residence. As a result, even different federal courts within the United
States have used unpredictable and inconsistent formulations to
determine a child’s habitual residence to establish original jurisdiction in
a child custody proceeding. A definition of habitual residence would
result in a uniform standard and jurisdictional certainty, especially if the
definition was drafted as clearly and unambiguously as possible.
Furthermore, courts would retain flexibility without being required to
meet precise standards if, as under the UCCJEA, the definition of
habitual residence permits courts to decline jurisdiction if the abducting
parent is found to have manipulated the law by participating in forum
shopping or if another court is held to be a more appropriate forum to
determine the merits of the child custody proceeding.
V. CONCLUSION
There are benefits and disadvantages to defining habitual residence
in the text of the Convention. When the fundamental goals of the
Convention are considered, most importantly the prompt return of a child
wrongfully removed, children who are victims of family abduction
would benefit from having habitual residence defined. A definition
would prevent the child’s prolonged stay where the child has been
wrongfully removed by allowing the determination of the child’s
habitual residence to be made in a swifter manner than if the term is left
undefined. Although judicial confusion in interpretation and application
of the Convention may not be completely eliminated, courts will benefit
from a defined term because it will result in uniform jurisdictional
certainty within the United States. This jurisdictional certainty can also
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be achieved worldwide if the United States’ view that a child’s cultural
ties are not to be considered in determining a habitual residence is
followed. The courts’ current complicated analysis, including the twopronged test that requires sub-inquiries to determine a child’s habitual
residence, would be eliminated if the term were to be defined. Most
importantly, a definition will help ensure that the most appropriate forum
can establish original jurisdiction and determine the merits of the child
custody proceeding in the child’s best interest.

